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influenced by the risk and uncertainty, 
and the impact on the real selection 
of  a  course  of  action  (CoA)  is 
significant. In the typical framework 
of a high-level DSS consis  tent with 
an  uncertainty,  sensitive,  top-down 
approach  is  important  to  transform 
the vision about dealing with risk and 
uncertainty, and providing a dynamic 
recognized picture of the battlefield, 
the  comparative  potential  of  actors 
and  their  logistics,  equipped  with 
1. AN INTRODUCTION IN THE 
ANALYSIS OF INNOVATIVE DSS 
FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS
DSS  (decision  support  systems) 
are represented by advanced rational/ 
analytic  instruments  capable  to 
offer an integrated framework and a 
robust basis for commander decision 
making.  All levels of commanders 
but especially high-level decision is 
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risk and uncer  tainty. 
The  new  framework  to  adopt 
FAR’s style decisions, is different from 
planning for the best-estimate future 
and  should  include  both  innovative 
rational  models  like  agent-based 
models,  issues  taken  from  control 
theory,  game-theoretic  simulation, 
the  operations  research,  applied  to 
military  systems,  but  also  human-
intensive  methods  (war-gaming, 
foresight  exercises,  Red-teaming, 
assumption-based  planning),  based 
on creativity, expertise and intuition, 
but  poorly  structured.  This  new 
framework  should  offer  a  better 
understanding of the mechanisms of 
high-level military decision making, 
based  on  an  innovative  mixing  of 
the emerging analytical methods and 
the  instruments  from  the  intuitive 
decision  making  style  that  capture 
the strengths of the components.
2. BASIC ASPECTS OF 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND 
SELECTION IN HIGH LEVEL 
MDMP
The classical concept of defense 
planning  should  be  related  to  the 
need to identify areas in which the 
decision makers search for more risk 
(Henry,  2006),  in  order  to  identify 
gaps in capability areas and to find 
activities  that  can  be  supported  by 
less funding in order to pay for the 
gap-filling. This is in fact a new way 
to implement the classic concept of 
the  challenge  of  program  ming  and 
budgeting  (Hitch,  McKean,  1965). 
The actions needed to balance budgets 
intelligently  involve  risks  and  the 
concept  of  balancing  risk,  inspired 
from the economic analysis express 
the ability to take more risks in some 
areas to pay for filling capability gaps 
in others. 
In classic military organizations, 
zoom capabilities. 
In  the  literature  (Davis,  Kulick, 
Egner,  2005)  are  presented  some 
aspects  regarding  DSS:  risks  and 
risk  mitigation  should  be  covered 
effectively,  and  provide  multiple 
mech  anisms  capable  to  create 
dedicated FAR strategies; the focus 
is on the ways to mitigate the risks 
in the context of FAR strategies; it 
offers more intuition in the design of 
different solutions, but also hedging 
strategies;  dealing  with  all  relevant 
factors offers new opportunities for 
commanders. 
In  the  modern  military  systems 
and processes the interest is to move 
toward  a  flexible,  adaptive,  and 
robust  (FAR)  strategy.  There  are 
different types of high-level MDMP 
from analytic to intuitive/ naturalistic 
to  rational/analytic.  DSS  designers 
tend  to  favor  rational-analytic 
methods, but real-world commanders 
often lean toward intuitive methods, 
arguing that models and simulations 
could not respond to the FAR (flex-
ible, adaptive, robust) strategies. 
But,  in  the  modern  literature,  it  is 
recognized  that  the  top-down  deci-
sion  support  should  accommodate 
both types of thinking, attempting to 
exploit the strengths and mitigate the 
weaknesses of each and is based on 
the both lines: rational commanders 
are aware that the options presented 
to  them  may  lack  creativity, 
imagination;  intuitive  commanders 
are aware that risks exist in executing 
their  strategies.  A  mix  between 
the  two  types  of  thinking  could  be 
interesting.  One  candidate  for  this 
mixed  framework  is  based  on  the 
portfolio-style method, inspired from 
economics,  and  capable  to  balance 
the risks, and the foresight exer  cises 
method,  inspired  from  psychology, 
that  addresses  the  need  to  include 
human factors in dealing with high REVIEW OF MODELS AND ANALYTIC INSTRUMENTS 
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adversary’s strat  egy is expressed by 
the lack of knowledge, in a similar 
way  of  the  treatment  in  PMESII 
(political, military, economic, social, 
information, infrastructure) domains 
and  attempts  different  DIME 
(diplomatic,  information,  military, 
economic) instruments.
The  basic  methods  for  analysis 
the future uncer  tainties (Davis, 1994, 
2002; Davis, Gompert, Kugler, 1996) 
are focused on a better understanding 
of  the  concept  of  the  capability  to 
adapt the net  worked forces (Gompert, 
Lachow,  Perkins,  2005;  Tilson, 
2005) in the context of mixing FAR 
strategies  (flexibility-  the  ability 
to  perform  different  missions; 
adaptiveness  -  the  ability  to  adjust 
read  ily  to  diverse  circumstances; 
robustness-  the  ability  to  withstand 
both foreseen and unforeseen shocks, 
such as surprise attacks or the loss of 
an important battle).
The treatment of deep uncertainty 
in  the  operational  risk  could  be 
also proceed by using the Adaptive 
Planning  (Bankston,  Key,  2006; 
Hoffman, 2006), a concept oriented 
primarily toward normal periods, for 
the conception and the develop  ment of 
operations plans in terms of capability 
packages, in a proper manner that can 
enhance the adaptability. In analytic 
decision  making,  the  treatment  of 
uncertainty  could  be  expressed  by 
using  alternative  CoAs.  Based  on 
its intuition, the commander is then 
focused  on  improving  the  basic 
plan and providing staff evaluations 
of  options  (most-likely,  best-case, 
worst-case). The commander reviews 
quickly  the  underlying  analysis 
and try to be syn  chronized with the 
analyst’s thinking and matched with 
his own character (conservator/ risk-
avoiding vs. ambitious/ risk-taking.
In  conclusion,  military  DSS 
should better address the quantitative 
subordinates  salute  the  plan  too 
uncritically,  rather  than  helping  the 
commander  to  identify  and  avoid 
problems inherent in the plan. There 
are  strong-willed  com  manders  who 
resist suggestions, and are intuitively 
inclined  to  participate  actively,  but 
also  commanders  who  are  always 
salut  ing political level directions. 
The  battlefield  and  military 
systems are represented by enormous 
and  deep  uncertainties,  and  this 
implies risks but also signal potential 
oppor  tunities.  The  concept  of  deep 
uncertainty  (Knight,  1921)  cannot 
be  ade  quately  treated  by  using 
simple random processes and cannot 
realistically  be  solved  in  near  real 
time.  Deep  uncertainty  should  be 
acknowledged in the planning process 
by considering alternative courses of 
action (CoA) and by implementing a 
better understanding of the possible 
effects of operations. 
High-level  decision  making 
is  responsible  for  establishing 
and  pursuing  suitable  visions  and 
formulates  the  basic  operational 
objectives. The focus is to obtain a 
framework capable to offer a proper 
design of operational objectives and 
actions.  In  addition  is  necessary  to 
identify  detailed  and  more-specific 
objectives expressed this time in the 
language  of  effects.  Commanders 
analyze the documents offered by the 
analyst, focused on the relative ability 
of CoA to achieve all objectives and 
related effects, and extend the vision 
over the core subset offered initially. 
In  the  new  complex  scenario-
space  typical  in  recent  conflicts, 
characterized  by  deep  uncertainty, 
are not understand the characteristics 
of the probability distribution. In the 
case  of  an  imaginary  strategy  of  a 
future adversary, the entire framework 
is  hypothetical  and  unknowable. 
The  deep  uncertainty  about  the REVIEW OF MODELS AND ANALYTIC INSTRUMENTS 
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with cost-effectiveness analysis and 
the  mathematics  of  aggregation.  In 
strategic decision-making, the use of 
orthogonal strategies is limited by the 
scenario space of the possible strate-
gies, but the optimal output should 
be filtered and mixed, because of the 
multiple  objectives  and  the  use  of 
FAR strategy. The use of orthogonal 
options in an analytic pro  cess should 
be  based  on  a  flexible  selection 
mixed  with  dynamic  adjustments, 
but in this complex task, the portfolio 
perspective, becomes more intuitive 
and effective. In the classic portfolio-
management  approach,  investments 
are  operated  in  different  types  to 
realize a balance among con  flicting 
objectives.
In  defense  planning,  objectives 
are more complex and is difficult to 
asses  the  likelihood  of  subsystems/ 
elements  but  a  portfolio  might 
involve activities capable to support 
the  general  objectives,  to  maintain 
the  military  capability,  and  to 
avoid  different  types  of  risks.  In 
this  approach  setting  priorities  and 
adjusting the weights of effort within 
the  portfolio  is  important  in  the 
context of limited resources.
In  the  literature  on  defense 
planning  (Davis,  Gompert,  Kugler, 
1996; Davis, 2002; Hillestad, Davis, 
1998;  Dreyer,  Davis,  2005)  are 
also presented the key aspects of a 
portfolio-  management  framework, 
that  responds  to  military  FAR 
restrictions:  the  routine  to  use 
portfolio  management  tools;  it 
responds  to  assessment  of  critical-
component  capabilities,  costs, 
and  benefit-cost  ratios  (near,  mid, 
long  term,  anticipation  of  strategic 
adaptations); portfolio adjustment fill 
gaps, balance risks and opportunities, 
prioritize by packages, and conduct 
marginal or chunky marginal analysis; 
it offers more levels of zoom where 
elements  of  uncertainty,  risk,  and 
choice,  hierarchically,  at  different 
levels  of  abstraction,  in  a  more 
effective way, capable to encourage 
the development of FAR strategies. 
The  mix  framework  to  evaluate 
and  improve  CoA  in  an  uncertain 
environment  is  realized  by  using 
analytic  methods  (war-gaming, 
human  gaming,  Red-teaming, 
assumption-based  planning,  agent-
based models, exploratory analysis) 
and agent-based models, that should 
be more focused on human methods 
and  should  be  better  adapted  for  a 
simple  use  by  commanders.  DSS 
support should include the credibility 
of  estimated  confidence  levels  as  a 
function of process. If the assessments 
are based only on in-group judgments 
the  credibility  is  low,  but  if  the 
judgments  reflect  Delphi  or  other 
techniques,  the  judgment  is  more 
credible.
3. REQUIREMENTS FOR A 
MILITARY DSS FRAMEWORK 
INSPIRED FROM ECONOMICS
Defense spending is characterized 
by cyclicality, and in crisis periods, 
like  the  period  2008-2010,  budget 
crunches  could  put  pressure  on 
important programs, could exacerbate 
the under funding of other programs 
and  could  stop  the  recapitalization 
process  of  materiel  used  in  recent 
operations. 
For all styles of defense planners, 
DSS should facilitate the economic 
selection,  but  for  commanders,  the 
resource  issue  is  less  focused  on 
budgets,  but  more  focused  on  the 
survivability of people and materiel. 
The portfolio management is an 
approach  inspired  from  economics, 
is  an  effective  instrument  for  the 
treatment of risk, based on a top-down 
mecha  nism  evaluation  equipped REVIEW OF MODELS AND ANALYTIC INSTRUMENTS 
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normal  and  extreme  risk  cases;  the 
use of composite risk indicators.
The interpretation of the analytical 
results  from  detailed  technical 
calculations  (the  so  called  zooms) 
should  be  easy  understandable  by 
using intuitive charts and simple logic 
tables, and tuned by a combination of 
intuitively vari  ables, charts allowing 
interactive response to questions, and 
simple logic tables.
P o r t f o l i o - m a n a g e m e n t 
instruments are well adapted for the 
top-down  perspective,  but  not  for 
going into much depth. A candidate 
ingredient is the exploratory analysis, 
in  which  all  of  the  key  parameters 
are  varied  simultaneously  so  that 
one  can  understand  results  as  a 
function  of  those  parameters  in 
the  complex  n-dimensional  space. 
In  the  cost  benefit  analysis  (CBA) 
the  most  important  issues  are  the 
following: a mechanism for exploring 
the  consequences  of  different 
perspectives  about  the  relative 
importance  of  different  missions 
and  constraints  and  the  relative 
probabilities of various risks; there is 
a need for marginal analysis (where 
to  spend/  cut)  and  a  more  chunky 
type  of  analysis  that  uses  larger 
increments of spending/ cuts; the use 
of cost-benefit strategic comparisons 
on large composite options. 
4. THE HUMAN GAMING 
INGREDIENT IN MDMP
The foresight approach seeks the 
potential drivers of change relative to 
a simple extrapolation. In uncertainty, 
plan  ning  based  on  extrapolation  is 
difficult, and the drivers of change are 
rarely  fully  control  lable.  Although 
the  development  of  foresight 
methods first occurred in nonmilitary 
applications, the central ideas are part 
of  an  ongoing  interaction  between 
needed in a clear assessment; it offers 
parametric  capability  models  for 
comprehensive  analysis;  it  permits 
the  development  of  families  of 
models, games, experiments.
This  framework  should  support 
the commander’s decision regarding 
the adjustment/ tuning of the portfolio 
so as to fill the gaps, balance risks/ 
opportunities,  prioritize  by  groups 
rather than by discrete activities, and 
even to conduct investment analysis, 
such as marginal or chunky marginal 
analysis.  Commanders  are  focused 
on the dynamics of the adjustment, 
the  flexibility  of  levels  of  zoom  or 
drill-down.  The  treatment  and  the 
representation  of  the  risk  within  a 
portfolio-management DSS is based 
on  the  following  risks:  acquisition 
risks  (feasibility,  cost),  at-the  time 
strategic risks (warning and decision 
time,  allied  permission  to  use 
bases),  operational  (effectiveness 
in  achieving  the  principal  effect 
sought, control of collateral damage, 
perceptions,  behaviors),  subsequent 
strategic-effect risks (the risk that a 
coalition will disintegrate, the fragility 
of domestic support). The set of risks 
includes risks involved in acquiring 
the  capa  bilities  in  the  first  place, 
risks  associated  with  their  usability 
when  needed  in  crisis  or  conflict, 
operational  risks  when  actually 
employed,  and  risks  associated 
with negative strategic effects (e.g., 
international  perceptions)  even  if 
the operation itself is successful and 
achieves  the  desired  operational-
level  effects.  The  representation  of 
different types of risks in a portfolio-
oriented DSS is difficult to be realized 
in  a  top-down  architecture  that 
needs  to  achieve  comprehensibility. 
Some authors (Davis, Shaver, 2008) 
propose  the  following  principles 
in the treatment of risks: the use of 
measures  of  effectiveness  for  both REVIEW OF MODELS AND ANALYTIC INSTRUMENTS 
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manner,  in  anticipation  of  requests 
for more information. 
5. THE USE OF THE CONCEPT 
OF FAMILY OF MODELS IN 
MDMP
Operation  planning  should  be 
matched with the strategy of multiple 
goals,  capable  to  improve  the 
probability of success. This is not a 
pure strategy and it should includes 
heavy  preparation  of  the  battle 
space (air power, ground maneuver 
forces,  information  operations)  and   
is design so as to avoid unnec  essary 
collateral damage.  An efficient use 
of alternative ways to achieve FAR 
strategies should be also considering 
portfolio-management techniques.
The  key  functional  needs  for 
analysis  and  supporting  modeling 
and simulation include: routine and 
perceptive  treatment  of  uncertainty, 
emphasis on FAR strate  gies, adaptive 
models and reinserting human capital 
in modeling and simulation and the 
use of the concept of family of models 
could  offer  a  better  functionality. 
The  particularities  of  the  concept 
of family of instruments to support 
analysis  would  include:  a  diversity 
of  models  with  different  levels  of 
resolution, perspective, and character 
and different degrees of interactivity; 
human  games  and  other  exercises 
structured to increase the analytical 
aspects; experiments for integration 
and  representing  phenomenology, 
other empirical work and consultation 
with  experts.  Strategic  simulations 
for  (multi)theater  strategic  and 
operational  levels  can  have  good 
capability  for  analytical  func  tions, 
decision support, and integration, but 
the models are not adaptive.
 Agent-based models in bottom-
up architecture have modest ability to 
explore phe  nomenology and human 
military and nonmilitary thinking. 
Indeed, the use of human gaming 
ingredient  in  the  form  of  foresight 
exercises could offer a good support 
for  commander  in  creating  and 
evaluating optimal CoAs. In military, 
the foresight approach is focused on 
building potential CoA in an attempt 
to obtain the desirable output. 
In  the  absence  of  an  efficient 
vision  of  the  future  potential  of 
forces,  commanders  build  different 
visions  (scenarios)  capable  to  offer 
a  logical  and  consistent  picture  of 
the  future,  and  then,  elaborate  the 
plan. In real world, the interest is to 
select scenarios that are intrinsically 
interesting or to decide which of the 
interesting scenarios could be used in 
planning. The challenge is to define 
a  set  of  scenarios  that,  if  used  to 
challenge  our  planning  in  different 
ways, will provide adequate insight 
into the larger scenario space of inter-
est. The creation of scenarios can be 
described as a set of tasks: expanding, 
structuring, focus  ing, assessing, and 
constructing.
The  first  step  is  to  expand  the 
evidence base, and to include all the 
elements (L factors) or relationships 
(R  factors)  is  included.  Then,  the 
analyst put form onto the information 
that  has  been  collected.  Expanding 
and structuring of tasks is not linear 
in time but is interactive and build the 
relational database in the collective 
mind  of  experts.  To  maintain 
coherence  and  comprehension, 
the  foresight  exercise  should 
have  a  focus,  based  on  objectives. 
The  assessment  tasks  match  the 
uncertainty of the scenarios with the 
aspects of the future taken as certain 
and the CoA, and identify the number 
and  nature  of  the  scenarios  to  be 
taken into account. Finally, the sce-
narios are build in a concrete, logical, 
meaningful,  and  thought-provoking REVIEW OF MODELS AND ANALYTIC INSTRUMENTS 
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the use of war-gaming to check on the 
adequacy of the factors and structure 
and  to  test  the  theory  in  extreme, 
difficult or ambiguous situations; the 
generation  of  alternative  adversary 
models, each of which, parameterized 
to  reflect  inherent  uncertainties; 
the  integration  of  the  exploratory 
analysis  to  develop  candidate 
FARs.  Another  version  (Santos, 
Zhao, 2006) address how adversary 
modeling  can  be  accomplished 
focuses  on  inferring  the  intent  and 
developing  the  consequences  of 
that  intent  for  subsequent  actions 
in  a  dynamic  environment.  In 
the  case  of  optionally  interactive 
simulation,  where  humans  may  be 
used to make C2 decisions, such as 
shifts in strategy or commitment of 
reserves, the simulation should take 
into account the following: a better 
representation  of  the  plans  in  the 
simulation; the possibility to do the 
simulation with interruption points at 
which  humans  review  the  situation 
and, as necessary, make adjustments 
in  the  strategy;  the  introduction  of 
new action sets and rules. 
The additional requirements refer 
to a more intuitive capability to build 
strategies  and  a  more  simple  way 
to build easily accessed libraries of 
building-block actions.
Another  strategy  is  based  on 
making  better  and  more  systematic 
use  of  experts.  The  focus  is  on 
the  following  methods:  Delphi 
(Helmer-Hirschberg, 1967; Linstone, 
Turoff,  2002),  Analytic  Hierarchy 
Process-  AHP  (Saaty,  1999), 
Value-Focused  Thinking-  VFT 
(Parnell, 2004), Subjective Transfer 
Function  Techniques-  STFT  (Veit, 
Callero, and Rose, 1984), Scenario-
Based  Planning-  SBP  (Schwartz, 
1995),  Day  After  Games-  DAG 
(Mussington,  2003),  Uncertainty-
Sensitive  Planning  –  USP  (Davis, 
action. Detailed models are important 
at low and intermediary levels, but 
are  poorly  suited  to  higher-level 
analysis or DSS, due to uncertainty. 
War-gaming  offers  agility  and 
high  speed  to  deal  with  previously 
unstudied issues. Multiple scenarios, 
can improve war- gaming offering a 
good focus on real factors, including 
human  perceptions  and  behaviors. 
Field experiments offer an integrated 
picture that includes human issues.
The  human  factor  should  be 
used  more  effectively  in  modeling 
and  simulation,  and  DSS  (human 
gaming,  use  of  experts).  Human 
games  are  idiosyncratic  to  players, 
focused  on  the  playing  through  of 
a  single  scenario,  undocu  mented, 
and  relatively  unstructured.  In 
this  case,  games  can  be  used  for 
the  following  analytical  purposes: 
discovery,  sensitization,  concept 
development, knowl  edge elicitation, 
identification  of  assumptions, 
and  testing  of  hypotheses.  In  the 
literature is presented how to make 
human  war-gaming  more  effective 
(Davis,  2004):  the  use  of  a  design 
focused on vignettes with relatively 
well-described  situations;  the  use 
of  competing  teams  with  different 
backgrounds to see/ test diverse tactics 
and  assumptions,  and  to  encourage 
teaming  and  team  protection;  to 
implement  record  planning  factors 
and reasoning used during team play; 
a more effective use of Red teams, 
both  to  better  appreciate  different 
ways of assessing the situation and 
defining objectives.
A  different  approach  (Davis, 
2002)  for  using  humans  and 
gaming  to  help  inform  and  tune 
adversary  models  is  based  on  the 
following aspects: it is necessary to 
develop  a  theory  and  structure  for 
understanding  possible  high-level 
adversary  decisions  and  behaviors; REVIEW OF MODELS AND ANALYTIC INSTRUMENTS 
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from  classic  portfolio-management 
methods mixed with human gaming. 
This  strategy  of  mixing  leads  to 
an  effective  implementation  of 
FAR  strategies,  based  on  a  better 
exploitation of the human innovation 
in adaptive models
The future design of DSSs should 
be focused toward the use not only on 
the classic modeling and simulation, 
but also on human-intensive methods 
such  as  war-gaming,  foresight 
exercises, Red-teaming, assumption-
based planning, and various methods 
for using experts.
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experts;  the  problem  related  to  the 
group  dynamics,  such  as  effects 
of  hierarchy  and  social  context, 
and  the  well-known  group-think 
phenomenon;  the  effective  cross-
disciplinary discussions when experts 
from  diverse  disciplines  often  have 
different languages, assumptions, and 
tacit knowledge; the tendency in the 
expert discussion/ group of experts, 
to  move  toward  a  best  estimate  or 
consensus,  rather  than  exploit  the 
opportunity  to  see  distributions  of 
possibilities.
6. CONCLUSIONS
There  is  a  clear  interest  for  the 
building  of  a  framework  capable 
to  offer  high-level  decision  sup-
port,  in  high  uncertainty,  in 
operations,  or  planning.  Modeling 
and  simulation  should  be  more 
oriented toward FAR (flexible, adap-
tive, robust). The adaptiveness may 
be  achieved  by  having  submodels 
that  adjust  simulated  strategy  and 
tactics  depending  on  objectives, 
situation,  and  projections  or 
submodels  representing  the  behav-
ior of individuals (adversary leaders), 
groups, or countries. The elements to 
improve adaptiveness include using 
agent- based models, control theory, 
game-theoretic  methods,  innovative 
model-related  operations-research 
algorithms,  in  different  styles, 
deterministic, stochastic, hybrids. 
The  principles  for  building  a 
military DSS capable to serve high-
level commanders are analyzed and 
it is also presented the possibilities 
to  use  and  adapt  the  inspiration 